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How News Media (De-)Legitimize National and International Climate Politics. A Content 
Analysis of Newspaper Coverage in Five Countries 
Abstract 
Implementing global climate change policies on the national and sub-national level requires 
the support of many societal actors. This support depends on the perceived legitimacy of 
climate policies, which can be sustained by legitimation debates in domestic news media. The 
following article analyzes legitimation statements on climate politics in newspapers of five 
countries for three Conferences of the Parties in 2004, 2009, and 2014 (n = 369 legitimation 
statements). According to our data, it is mainly the legitimacy of international climate policies 
(instead of national ones) which is evaluated in national fora, and it is usually portrayed 
negatively. However, there is a noticeable shift in the arguments used over our 10-year period 
of analysis, moving from efficiency as the dominating evaluation criterion to questions of 
fairness in the distribution of costs and gains.   
 
 
Keywords: Legitimation debates, climate change politics, comparative content analysis, 
Conference of the Parties, global governance, transnational public sphere 
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1 Introduction  
Political solutions to address climate change are sought to a considerable degree on the global 
level. This is particularly relevant for mitigating climate change, i.e., for efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, which represent the most important avenue of current climate 
politics. The Paris agreement negotiated at the Conference of the Parties in 2015 represents a 
major success of this form of response to global warming. In its aftermath, however, the 
pitfalls and problems of climate politics negotiated at the global level became all too apparent 
when the U.S. president Donald Trump announced the U.S.’ withdrawal from the agreement 
in 2017: The success of these international efforts clearly depends on the support they receive 
on the national level. They have to be ratified and implemented in national contexts (Giddens, 
2011). This is particularly important as, unlike „hard“ EU regulations, UNFCCC agreements 
are less binding and allow for more interpretation and variation (Zürn, 2004). Without strict 
legal bindings or effective enforcement proceedings in place, national compliance with 
international norms and regulations strongly depends on their perceived legitimacy: ‘the 
extent to which a rule is recognizable as a legitimate obligation affects the extent to which it is 
obeyed’ (Franck, 1990). In other words, even if U.S. president Donald Trump had not openly 
renounced the Paris agreement, its implementation in the U.S. would have been severely 
handicapped by the fact that its current political leadership, and a substantial part of its 
population, is not convinced of its legitimacy.  
To understand the potential impact of international climate politics, it is therefore essential to 
look at how they become subject to national debates in which different stakeholders compete 
to make their positions and policy preferences heard with the aim of influencing how 
international agreements are debated in domestic media and, indirectly, their chances of 
success on the national and international level.  
     News media are the most important arena – the ‘master forum’ (Ferree et al., 2002: 9) – of 
such public debates. There, society’s problems are defined and different stakeholders’ 
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arguments are presented to citizens and decision-makers. The media and journalists take 
active parts in such media debates, partly by selecting and presenting others’ views and 
preferences in certain ways, partly by voicing their own.  
     A large, and still rising, number of studies have analyzed media portrayals of climate 
change (for overviews see Nisbet et al., 2018 or Schäfer and Schlichting, 2014). But while 
they have dealt with numerous facets of such media portrayals, such as issue attention (e.g., 
Schmidt et al., 2013; Schäfer et al., 2014), framing (e.g., Shehata and Hopmann, 2012; 
O’Neill et al., 2015), attributions of the responsibilities for climate change (Post et al., 2018) 
or the representation of the science of climate change (e.g., Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; Ladle 
et al., 2005), only few of them have focused on climate politics and, particularly, its 
legitimation in media debates (e.g., Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al., 2013). This is a surprising 
desideratum given the importance of the issue. We approach this problem by analyzing the 
legitimation of climate politics in the newspaper coverage of different countries. We compare 
patterns in legitimation debates surrounding the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) in 2004, 
2009 and 2014 in five countries that are affected by climate change and climate politics to 
different degrees, and also outline differences over time.  
     The conceptual framework of the study, its research questions and hypotheses will be 
presented in section 2. Section 3 outlines its data and methods. Section 4 presents the results 
and section 5 summarizes and discusses them.  
 
 
2 Theoretical Framework: Legitimating Climate Politics in the Media  
2.1 Media Debates of Climate Change, Climate Politics, and the COPs  
News media are essential for democratic societies. In an idealized view, they provide a public 
forum for political debate and thus an overview for citizens of relevant political issues and the 
different political positions concerning those (Ferree et al., 2002). In recent years, climate 
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change has increasingly been discussed in media around the world, though there remain 
substantial national differences in the amount of media attention (Schmidt et al., 2013, 
Broadbent et al., 2016): Climate change as a topic is much stronger in industrialized countries, 
though the issues has gained more attention in emerging economies such as India and Brazil 
lately.  
     International events such as the COPs have been particularly impactful in bringing the 
issue of climate change to the attention of the media and, thus, of the citizens. During COPs, 
media coverage about climate change peaks annually (Schmidt et al., 2013, Schäfer et al. 
2014), and the conferences themselves are crucial deliberative opportunities for stakeholders 
in climate change politics (Lück et al., 2018). They also have an impact on citizens’ attention 
towards climate change, even though their effects on citizens attitudes remain debated 
(Brüggemann et al., 2017). The question remains whether this coverage has the potential to 
increase the political legitimacy of climate change politics.  
The legitimacy of a political system or regime denotes its rightfulness and acceptance. 
Research on the legitimacy of specific political regimes either addresses the so-called 
objective legitimacy, which is assessed based on a-priori defined normative criteria derived 
from democratic theory. Or it explores subjective legitimacy, tapping into the societal 
acceptance of political regimes by analyzing the legitimacy evaluations of the people affected 
by them and the underlying evaluation criteria (Fuchs, 2011). Subjective legitimacy relates to 
the regime as a whole. It can be understood as a form of ‘diffuse support’ (Easton, 1965), 
which in turn is expected to increase the acceptance of and support for specific regulations 
and laws, hence, effective government (Scharpf, 2003).  
     From a normative-objective perspective, most international political regimes have a 
democratic deficit compared to the democratic nation states that transferred (some of) their 
power to them (Zürn, 2004). In climate politics, the societal acceptance (i.e., the subjective 
legitimacy) of the involved international institutions and their regulations is particularly 
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important for a number of reasons (adapted from Zürn, 2004): Firstly, the eventual addressees 
of climate regulations are often not national governments but societal actors such as the 
citizens themselves or private companies. After all, they are the ones needed to adapt more 
climate-friendly habits or develop more climate-friendly products and technologies. Secondly, 
this regulation needs to be coordinated not only on a national level, but also beyond national 
borders. Thirdly, climate politics is concerned with highly complex problems that are not 
easily understandable for many citizens (Moser, 2010; Schäfer, 2015). Consequently, ‘unlike 
most other international regimes, [climate politics’] failure is even possible if the signatory 
governments have the full intention to reduce CO2 emissions.’ (Zürn, 2004: 269). It requires 
extensive administrative and technological resources to implement the international 
regulations on the (sub)national level, and notwithstanding the amount of resources allocated, 
all efforts may fail simply because citizens refuse to change their daily habits or companies 
refuse to develop the required products because they do not perceive the policies as 
legitimate.   
     Given their lack of objective legitimacy, international political regimes depend more 
strongly than national political actors on subjective legitimacy which ‘is established and 
challenged through a rational discourse’ (Steffek, 2003: 271). The role of news media in 
providing a forum of debate is particularly important given the abstract nature of the 
underlying political issue. Without media debates, climate policy has little chance to gain 
subjective legitimacy, and thus potentially support, among ordinary citizens who are needed 
to adjust their lifestyles or develop their own ideas on how to contribute towards climate 
saving political goals.  
     According to Hurrelmann et al. (2009), such legitimation debates consist of statements 
addressing the legitimacy of political objects (= legitimation statements). Following 
Habermas’ understanding of discourse as an exchange of intersubjective ‘speech acts’ 
(Habermas, 2003), legitimation discourse and thus the subjective legitimacy ascribed to 
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certain political regimes can be ascertained by looking for these legitimation statements in 
news media. Legitimation statements are statements in which the legitimacy of political 
objects (such as the political system, political institutions, political actors or policies) is 
assessed based on normative ideals (see also Hurrelmann et al., 2009).  
     Our first research question, therefore, is: To what degree are national and international 
political climate regimes the objects of legitimation statements in national media?  
As the awareness of climate change in general, and of climate politics as the most important 
way of addressing it has increased in most countries in recent years (Schmidt et al., 2013), we 
assume that the increase in climate change coverage is mirrored by an increase in 
legitimation statements in the media as well (H1).  
     Our second research question asks: What patterns of legitimation statements are found 
in media debates? According to Hurrelmann et al. (2009), legitimation statements typically 
include a source (the author of the statement such as a journalist, political actor or citizen), a 
legitimation object (such as the IPCC), its evaluation (whether is the object legitimized or de-
legitimized), and the arguments on which the evaluation is based (normative legitimation 
criteria).  
     As climate change is generally perceived as a problem of global scale requiring a globally 
coordinated response, we expect that legitimation statements are more likely to focus on this 
international level of climate politics (H2a). As more and more countries have ratified the 
Kyoto protocol (or now the Paris agreement), we further expect that climate politics has 
shifted from establishing an international regime to the implementation of its decisions on the 
national and subnational level, leading to an increased scrutiny of the national level (H2b).  
Similarly, we assume that international actors have a greater need to legitimize their existence 
and actions than national actors, given the lack of objective legitimacy. Based on this, we 
expect that, more often than national actors, international actors appear as sources of 
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legitimation statements (H3a). However, with the domestication of climate politics, national 
actors should increasingly become involved in the discussion of their legitimacy (H3b).  
Regarding the evaluation of climate politics in legitimation statements, we assume that 
international climate politics are more often de-legitimized than national politics (H4a) – as 
they lack objective legitimacy and cannot effectively defend themselves against attacks in 
national arenas. Given the generally growing acceptance of climate change as a global 
problem, however, we expect that both national and international climate regimes are 
increasingly legitimized (and decreasingly delegitimized) in public discourse (H4b).  
     In legitimizing or delegitimizing political regimes, speakers may make use of a wide range 
of arguments. Previous studies have identified a number of potential legitimation arguments 
or criteria for political governance on different levels of government (Nullmeier et al., 2010) 
and for specific policy fields (Schneider et al., 2010).  
     These legitimation criteria can relate either to the input or to the output of the political 
process (Scharpf, 1999): Input-based arguments concern the question of how political 
decisions are reached. An example would be whether all people affected by policies are 
represented in the decision-making process (representation), or whether they actually have a 
chance to participate and contribute actively (participation). As the international level of 
climate politics is currently dominating the media coverage, questions of representation and 
participation might be discussed both with respect to the respective nation – whether one’s 
own nation and its interests were adequately represented in the international arena – and to 
civil society and citizens (for a similar argument relating to global energy governance, see 
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2015). Even though NGOs representing citizens’ interests are relevant 
players in international policy negotiations (Kuyper et al., 2018), this does not necessarily 
mean that their participation is visible in domestic media debates.  
     Other arguments regarding the input in the climate policy process might relate to the 
question whether an exchange of arguments occurs (deliberation), whether the process is 
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transparent (transparency), its participants are credible (credibility) and possess the required 
expertise and experience or at least base the decision on expert knowledge (expertise; table 
1).The latter argument is of particular importance in the case of climate politics given the 
scientific complexity (and at times uncertainty) relating to both the issue itself and the 
proposed policy measures.  
     Output-based arguments relate to the results of the political decision process, their nature 
and consequences (Scharpf, 1999: 682). For example, arguments could refer to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the policy output. In the field of climate politics, effectiveness 
of proposed policies is a particularly relevant argument, given the fact that proposed measures 
often depend on prolonged ratification processes and their impact on climate change can be 
difficult to assess.  
     Output legitimacy might also relate to the question of whether climate policy observes 
human rights, empowers people in climate change politics, or whether it achieves a fair 
distribution of costs and gains or enhances the common good (fairness/common good). In 
particular, the question of the fairness has received much attention in public debate of 
international climate regimes, as countries strongly differ in how strongly they have 
contributed historically towards climate change, and how affected they are by climate change 
itself or by the proposed measures (Post et al., 2018).  
     As experimental studies have shown that public support of international environmental 
governance depends more on output than on input criteria of legitimacy (Bernauer et al., 
2016), we hypothesize that output criteria of legitimacy also play a greater role in national 
debates of climate change policy (H5a).  
     Hurrelmann et al. also differentiate between arguments relating to ‘essential features of 
democracy’ (Hurrelmann et al., 2009: 499)i, such as representation or the protection of human 
rights, and those that are not essential to democracy from a normative perspective, such as 
effectiveness or expertise. It could be argued that in the field of climate politics, these non-
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essential legitimacy arguments may in fact be more important given the scientific and political 
complexity of the issue. In addition, Scharpf (2000) has argued that we are currently 
witnessing a general ‘change in the normative formations of the democratic nation-state’s 
legitimacy’ from essential to non-essential criteria, in particular towards effectiveness. We 
therefore assume that such a shift towards non-essential criteria is also observable in the 
legitimation of climate politics (H5b).  
 
- Table 1 about here -  
 
     In addition to these hypotheses, we will explore in our third research question whether 
these legitimacy patterns differ between countries. On a general level, news coverage of 
international events such as the COPs tends to be ‘domesticated’, i.e., adapted to national 
political interests and national political culture (Nossek and Kunelius, 2012). In the case of 
legitimacy debates, this is also likely to be the case: When journalists and political actors 
argue for or against the legitimacy of a political regime, they will use arguments that resonate 
with their respective audiences (Hurrelmann et al. 2012). In their reporting, journalists might 
give preference to legitimation statements by international actors that align with the national 
political culture.  
In the specific case of climate change policy, the interest in international climate regimes as 
legitimation objects, but also the sources of legitimation statements might depend on a 
nation’s general involvement in international regimes (for example as part of the EU, NATO 
or the UN), i.e., its ‘degree of political internationalization’ (Hurrelmann et al., 2009: 492). 
Legitimacy evaluations as well as legitimation arguments might depend on a country’s 
affectedness by climate change effects: In more affected countries, for example, the 
effectiveness of climate policies might play a greater role in evaluating climate politics. By 
contrast, fairness might be more important for countries strongly affected by secondary effects 
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of climate change or for emerging economies who feel less responsible for causing climate 
change in the first place. In a similar manner, countries that are not involved in international 
regimes are more likely to question the legitimacy of the input of a decision-making process 
in which they find themselves not represented and unable to participate.  
 
3 Data and Methods  
3.1 Identification of relevant articles 
This study is based on a content analysis of coverage of the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) 
in 2004 (Buenos Aires), 2009 (Copenhagen) and 2014 (Lima) in opinion leading national 
newspapers in five countries – Australia, Brazil, Germany, India and the United States of 
America. We chose democratic countries in which the freedom of the press was by and large 
guaranteed throughout the period of investigation (Freedom House, 2012; cf. Wessler et al., 
2016), and which are vulnerable to climate change to different degrees (e.g., Harmeling, 
2009). In addition, we included both industrialized Western as well as emerging economies 
(Schäfer et al., 2014). 
     For each country, we analyzed one liberal-leaning and one conservative-leaning 
newspaper.ii We sought to identify all the newspaper articles on climate change politics that 
were published from one week before until one week after each COP.iii In a first step, we 
drew all newspaper articles from Lexis Nexis and Factivaiv that contained the terms ’climate‘, 
or ’global warming‘. In a second step, we developed a complex search term in English, 
German, and Portuguese based on which we could differentiate the articles on climate change 
politics from articles on other subjects. To evaluate our search term, we calculated accuracy 
(the share of articles that was classified correctly as relevant or irrelevant by the search filter), 
precision (the degree to which articles that were identified as relevant for climate politics 
were correctly identified), recall (the ratio of articles coded as relevant to all relevant articles 
in the sample) and F-values (the harmonic mean of precision and recall (Scharkow 2011, table 
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2) based on the comparison of our search results with a manual classification of about 100 
articles. For all these measures, we obtained values well above .80 for all languages, which 
indicates that our search filters were well reliable. 
 
- Table 2 about here -  
 
     Through this procedure, we identified 316 articles in the Australian and 228 in the Sydney 
Morning Herald, 169 in the Estado do Sao Paulo and 167 in the Folha de Sao Paulo, 257 in 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 316 in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, 137 in the Hindu and 
127 in the Times of India, 113 in the New York Times and 108 in the Washington Post. For 
our manual content analysis, we randomly selected samples of 20 articles per newspaper and 
year. In some years, some newspapers published less than 20 articles. In this case, we 
analyzed all articles. 
 
3.2 Coding procedure 
Four coders identified and coded the legitimization statements. Following Hurrelmann et al. 
(2009), we defined legitimation statements as evaluative references to political objects or 
processes that are legitimized or delegitimized by a speaker based on specific arguments. As 
political objects of legitimation, we captured domestic national political actors or processes, 
national political actors or processes in countries abroad as well as supranational actors, 
organizations, institutions, regimes or processes. As speakers, we captured social actors from 
all domains, e.g., civil society (NGOs, activists), national politics, international politics, 
economics, science and academia, journalists and others (such as members of churches, artists 
etc.). In addition, we captured their countries of origin. As arguments for (de-)legitimation, 
we captured references to the input and the output of climate change policies, as well as 
arguments essential and non-essential to democracies. As we look at legitimation statements 
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in newspapers, speakers of legitimation statements can be either actors cited by journalists 
(directly or indirectly) or the journalists themselves, if they express a clear evaluation of a 
political object (this is more likely to occur in comments and editorials, but can also occur in 
other journalistic genres).  
     Coders were trained to identify legitimation statements based on the three elements 
speaker, object of legitimation, and argument. Reliability tests of the arguments of 
legitimation are based on all the statements that were identified by at least one of the four 
coders or the principle investigator (n = 52). For each statement that coders identified, they 
assigned positive codes for legitimizing and negative codes for delegitimizing arguments. For 
each case in which a coder did not identify a statement that others identified a zero was 
assigned. Based on this dataset, we calculated Krippendorff’s alpha = .80 indicating that 
reliability of identifying relevant statements and coding the correct evaluative arguments was 
very satisfactory (due to reliability concerns, we combined the two legitimation criteria 
fairness and common good in one category). Coders’ test classifications of speakers, their 
countries of origin as well as the objects of legitimation were based on 81 cases. As the 
catalogue of objects of legitimation was aggregated from the catalogue of speakers, we did 
not calculate separate tests for the objects of legitimation. Both the coding of the speakers’ 
function in a respective social domain (Krippendorff’s alpha = .84) as well as their countries 
of origin (Krippendorff’s alpha = .93) were highly reliable. 
 
4 Results  
4.1 Prevalence of legitimation statements in the media 
Our first research question concerns the prevalence of legitimation statements concerning 
climate politics in domestic media. The analysis shows that matters of legitimation play a 
considerable role in media coverage about Conferences of the Parties, with coders identifying 
343 legitimation statements in the 502 articles of our sample: Overall, approximately 40 
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percent of all articles on climate politics also address questions of legitimacy. There is, 
however, no clear evidence for an increase of legitimation statements over time (H1a 
falsified): In most countries, legitimacy was debated relatively often during COP 2004 (42 
percent), but this did not intensify, or decline, for COP 2009. In 2014, the share of articles on 
climate politics touching upon legitimacy questions reaches similar levels as in 2004. 
     Furthermore, the analyzed countries differ clearly in the importance that their respective 
media give to legitimation statements. Striking differences exist between the developed, 
industrialized countries Australia, Germany and the US on the one side, where legitimation 
statements are comparatively common and the legitimacy of climate change policies is 
debated very often, and emerging economies Brazil and India on the other side, where the 
legitimacy of climate regimes – as well as the COPs themselves – are debated less frequently. 
This mirrors findings on the different degrees of media attention to climate issues in 
‘Western’ vis-à-vis non-‘Western’ countries (Schmidt et al., 2013) as well as qualitative 
studies on the different frames of climate politics in these countries (Billett, 2010; Schmidt 
and Schäfer, 2015).  
 
- Table 3 about here  -  
 
4.2 Patterns of legitimation statements  
For our second research question, we look in more detail at the patterns of legitimation 
statements. Regarding the objects of legitimation, the bulk of legitimation statements 
addresses the (de-)legitimacy of international climate politics, its institutions or regimes (63 
percent). For example, representatives of the US administration explain their refusal to sign 
the international agreement by ‘challenging the scientific assumptions underlying the Kyoto 
protocol’ (Rother, New York Times, December 19th, 2004). By contrast, in Germany the COP 
2004 was praised as a ‘historical moment’ as the Kyoto protocol was finally entering into 
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force and first results could already be seen (Kreye, Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 18th, 
2004).  
About a quarter of the statements are directed at domestic climate regimes of the respective 
country, whereas the national climate politics of other individual countries are only discussed 
in 10 percent of the statements (confirming H2a). In our sample, the focus on international 
climate politics is strongest in 2009, but drops again in 2014. In other words, there is no 
continuous increase of the relevance of the national level of climate politics and policies 
(rejecting H2b).  
     However, we can observe country differences in our sample. In the US, legitimation 
statements have shifted from a national to an international focus over time (Konieczny, 2014). 
By contrast, in Australia and Brazil, the attention became increasingly directed towards 
national climate politics. The role of national climate regimes has remained stable in Germany 
and India, though at different levels: In Germany, the role of national climate politics is 
comparatively strong (40 percent) whereas in India, it is minimal (six percent). This is in line 
with Billett’s (2010) findings that Indian media coverage on climate change focused mostly 
on the responsibility of developed countries, and also in line with the results of a comparative 
analysis of attributions of responsibility based on the same data set as this study (Post et al., 
2018). It deviates, however, from a comparative study of climate change coverage by 
Broadbent et al. (2016), who showed that Indian media frame climate change mostly by 
looking at domestic ecological impacts, whereas German media coverage focuses on climate 
change’s global impact. This indicates a problematic gap between how climate change is 
defined as a problem in media debates, and on which level political solutions for this problem 
are discussed. 
 
- Table 4 about here –  
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     According to our data, both political actors and journalists account for about 30 percent of 
the legitimation statements. Scientific experts (15 percent) and NGOs or climate activists (11 
percent) also often evaluate the legitimacy of climate change politics, followed by economic 
actors (eight percent). In the proceding analysis, we will not focus on the type of speakers, but 
on their origin: Is the debate about the legitimacy of climate change politics in domestic 
media dominated by domestic speakers or those from the international arena? 
     Notwithstanding international institutions’ predominance in the realm of climate politics, 
international actors are not the main sources of legitimation statements in domestic media 
(rejecting hypothesis 3a). Domestic speakers dominate legitimacy debates overall (57 
percent), and their share has increased over time (from 49 to 63 percent, confirming H3b).  
     This overall finding again masks variation between the countries, however. In the 
developing countries Brazil and India, domestic speakers are second to speakers from other 
countries or speakers from international climate politics institutions (Schäfer et al. 2018).  
Notably, speakers from international organizations or institutions play a comparatively 
prominent role in India (Billett, 2010; Schäfer et al., 2014). This is surprising given Lück et 
al.’s (2018) finding that at several COPs there was a comparatively close contact between the 
Indian press corps and its delegation. Apparently, this close contact has not made national 
speakers the preferred sources for statements on the legitimacy of climate politics. By 
contrast, speakers from other countries play a comparatively prominent role in Brazil. And the 
trend of a domestication of legitimation statements has a notable exception: It is not found in 
the US, where domestic speakers are increasingly replaced by speakers from other countries 
or international organizations or institutions (Konieczy, 2014).  
     Most of the speakers cited from other countries in legitimation statements are from the US 
(29 percent of 79 legitimation speakers from abroad in news coverage in Australia, Brazil, 
Germany, India and the UK), Russia (10 percent), China (9 percent), Germany (9 percent), the 
UK (6 percent) or India (6 percent). Though the Brazilian COP delegation has the strongest 
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outreach strategy to international journalists (Lück et al. 2018), this strategy has not resulted 
in Brazil being heard in the legitimacy debates of other countries (only a single legitimation 
statement from a Brazilian speaker was found outside Brazilian media).  
 
- Table 5 about here –  
 
     Overall, legitimation statements in the realm of climate politics mostly serve to de-
legitimize, in line with findings from political communication research on other policy fields 
(Schneider et al., 2010) or on other international institutions (Gronau et al., 2009) and with the 
systemic preference of journalism for negativity and criticism (Lengauer et al., 2012). As 
assumed in hypothesis 4a, the share of critical statements is higher for international climate 
politics (76 percent) than for domestic objects (25 percent). Furthermore, signs of an 
increasingly more positive evaluation are weak at best; there is only a marginal increase in the 
share of positive evaluations between 2004 and 2014. In the case of domestic climate politics, 
their support increased between 2004 and 2009, but then drops again (H4b rejected).  
     No clear pattern emerges when looking at the evaluation of climate regimes in the different 
countries: In both Germany and Brazil, support for domestic climate regimes is comparatively 
strong (39 and 43 percent are positive evaluations, respectively). In Germany, this is also 
mirrored by a comparatively strong support for international climate regimes (44 percent 
positive). However, in both emerging economies, i.e., in Brazil and in India, the legitimacy of 
international regimes is strongly questioned (with only 10 and 13 percent positive 
evaluations) on the rare occasions that it is being debated (see 4.1, and also Billett, 2010; 
Schmidt and Schäfer, 2015).  
 
- Table 6 about here –  
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     The described (de)legitimation statements rely mostly on a small selection of arguments: 
For both national and international climate regimes, efficiency/effectiveness arguments are 
mostly used to evaluate their legitimacy (share of 67 and 54 percent respectively). For 
example the Kyoto protocol is criticized because the ‘pledged emissions cuts would almost 
certainly allow for warming far beyond 2 degrees Celsius, the threshold beyond which 
scientists say global warming could be disastrous.’ (n.a., The Washington Post, December 
20th, 2009). Together with fairness/common good and human rights/empowerment arguments, 
the share of legitimacy evaluations based on the output of the political process makes up a 
large majority of all (de)legitimation arguments. It accounts for 78 percent (national) and 70 
percent (international) of statements (de-)legitimizing climate regimes regimes (H5a 
confirmed).  
     In the case of national regimes, this dominance of output-based criteria becomes even 
stronger over time, as efficiency, a non-essential criterion for democratic regimes, and human 
rights/empowerment, a criterion essential for democratic regimes, gain prominence. Around 
the COP 2014, 17 percent of all evaluations of national regimes refer to the empowerment of 
people or the protection of individual human rights and liberties. This comes at the expense of 
the input criterion expertise/experience, whose share dropped from 13 to three percent. 
Overall, there is no increase in the relevance of non-essential democratic criteria for 
evaluating national climate regimes (75 percent in 2004, 79 percent in 2009 and 77 percent in 
2014).  
     With regard to the evaluation of the legitimacy of international climate regimes, input-
based criteria such as representation, participation and transparency have gained importance 
between 2004 and 2014 (from 21 percent to 33 percent): In particular, the 2014 COP in Lima 
was judged harshly on input criteria, e.g. when journalists wrote that ‘COP 20 will be 
remembered for bad process, non-transparency & non-inclusiveness.’ (n.a., Times of India, 
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December 14th, 2014). This criticism was not limited to the news coverage in emerging 
economies, the Australian also criticized the COP for ‘not allowing the views of the countries 
to be heard’ (n.a., The Australian, December 10th, 2014). At the same time, efficiency lost in 
prominence (dropping from 64 to 47 percent). The overall share of arguments from the core 
of democratic theory thus increases in the debate of the legitimacy of international climate 
regimes (to 33 percent in 2014). Hence, hypothesis 5b is not confirmed for international 
regimes. 
     Again, country differences are visible, even though the small number of cases calls for 
cautious interpretation. Most striking is the overwhelming dominance of efficiency as an 
argument in German legitimation discourse of national climate politics (89 percent of all 
arguments). Looking at the statements on international climate regimes, the case of India 
stands out, where input-based as well as democratic criteria dominate: In India, international 
climate regimes are mostly evaluated based on whether they allow the participation of all 
affected countries, and whether the proceedings are transparent (Billett, 2010). Their 
efficiency, by contrast, is contested much less than in other countries. In the German debate of 
international climate politics it is also notable that arguments regarding fairness in the 
distribution of costs and risks are used comparatively often (22 percent), reflecting a strategic 
stance that the differentiation between industrialized countries and developing nations in their 
responsibility for limiting climate change is ‘outdated’ (‘Die Industriestaaten halten diese 
Trennung für überholt.’ Mihm, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 15th, 2014). Yet, 
the developing countries Brazil and India rarely refer to this argument (five and eleven 
percent, respectively). 
 
- Table 7 and table 8 about here –  
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5 Discussion and Conclusion  
Domestic debates about the legitimacy of international and global policy regimes are 
important, as these endeavors often have an inherent democratic deficit while still depending 
on national implementation. This is particularly true for politics addressing climate change, a 
global problem transgressing national boundaries in its causes and effects for which solutions 
are sought mostly via international political agreements.  
     National media debates play an important role in the (de)legitimation of such international 
politics. Given this importance of media debates about international climate politics, it is 
surprising that very few studies have focused on them so far. We tried to remedy this, and 
were able to show that analyzing legitimation debates in the media is a worthwhile subject: 
When, in the context of the COPs, climate politics is covered in the media of different 
countries, the question of their legitimacy is touched upon regularly in the industrialized 
countries under study, though less often in the emerging economies Brazil and India.  
     Perhaps not surprising given our focus on three COPs, most of the legitimation discourse 
focuses on international climate politics, policies and institutions. These international actors 
and organizations, however, rarely get the chance to defend (or challenge) their own 
legitimacy. The debate is dominated by domestic speakers, or in the case of emerging 
economies and increasingly of the US, by speakers from other individual countries. Overall, 
these speakers are not impressed with climate regimes: They strongly question the legitimacy 
of international climate politics and, to a slightly lesser degree, of national climate politics. 
Their main argument relates to the perceived inefficiency of international and national climate 
regimes. 
     However, it could be argued that because climate change politics are a new policy field, 
the fact that its legitimacy is already being regularly discussed (in the industrialized nations) 
represents a step in the right direction. This is particularly true as climate change policy is 
often evaluated negatively because of its lack of effectiveness: After all, these negative 
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evaluations do not negate the overall need for climate change policy, but can also be 
interpreted as calls for more effective climate governance.  
     The aforementioned pattern did not change much during the ten years of our analysis. 
There is a slight trend towards an even further domestication of legitimation debates, as 
domestic speakers increased their share of all voices at the cost of speakers from other 
countries or from international institutions. The most interesting shifts occurred with respect 
to the arguments used to evaluate climate politics: Though efficiency remains the most 
important argument, it loses some of its prevalence with regard to international climate 
politics. This may be a result of the (slow) political progress achieved. As more and more 
countries ratified the climate agreements, the discussion no longer concentrated on the 
question of whether they will enter into force or not, but moved on to concrete conflicts 
caused by their implementation, in particular with regard to a fair distribution of costs and 
gains.  
     From a normative point of view, the conclusions we can draw from our empirical 
assessment of the discursive legitimation of climate politics are rather disappointing. Though 
international climate politics have the greater need to be the focus of legitimation debates due 
to their lack of objective legitimacy, they are mostly reduced to a passive role, with little 
chance to improve the overall negative evaluation of their legitimacy (cf. Konieczny, 2014). 
As in the case of other international institutions, such as the EU, the preferred strategy of 
national political actors appears to be to ‘shift blame’ to the international level to increase 
their own standing (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Gerhards et al., 2009). In addition, most of the 
legitimation statements are based on arguments non-essential to democratic regimes, such as 
efficiency and fairness. Hence, it is doubtful that the observed debates can enhance the 
general democratic awareness of citizens or contribute to improving the overall acceptance of 
climate politics – on the international or national level.  
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     This may not have stopped the successful ratification of the Paris agreement in 2016, but it 
may hinder its successful implementation in the future when local, regional and national 
conflicts regarding concrete climate policies arise. It thus seems regrettable that, with the 
notable exception of Germany, national debates mostly missed out on the opportunity to bring 
national climate politics into the discussion of the COPs. This problematic disconnect 
between the international and national level of climate politics seems strongest in the 
emerging economies – particularly in India, where international climate politics are depicted 
as a distant, negative affair, a playing field for international actors (cf. Billett, 2010; Schäfer et 
al., 2014), in which India does not have much of a role (or is refused a role), but whose 
decisions also seem inconsequential to the country. This does not bode well for the acceptance 
of local climate politics in support of the Paris agreement by the Indian population. 
     As all studies, this study has a number of limitations as well: Climate politics is a 
comparatively young policy field, which has come under public scrutiny only in recent years. 
To sample a sufficient amount of articles on climate politics for all countries and years of 
analysis, we focused on newspaper coverage before, during and after the COPs. Selecting 
such an international and decidedly political event may have influenced our results in several 
ways, and may be partly responsible for the strong(er) attention to international over national 
climate politics or the focus on output-related, non-democratic arguments for (the perceived 
lack of) legitimacy.  
     Despite this sampling strategy, case numbers are rather low, in particular for our first point 
of observation (the COP of 2004), and for the national level of climate politics. As a result, 
we had to forgo a differentiation between legitimation debates in newspapers of different 
political leanings and not all of our results achieve statistical significance. However, as in 
some cases we have analyzed a high share of or even all relevant articles, we are confident 
that we can still draw valid conclusions.  
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     It was the aim of our country selection to reflect possible differences in the public 
legitimation of climate politics between industrialized countries and emerging economies with 
varying levels of responsibility for and affectedness by climate change. Some of the 
differences between countries we identified in our study, however, may not be specific to the 
debate of climate politics but grounded in the more general differences in journalistic and 
political cultures of the respective countries. For example, both Indian and Brazilian 
journalists have a more collaborative understanding of journalism, in which journalists are 
more willing to support government policy, to convey a positive image of political leaders and 
to support the national development (WJS, 2017). This might make them less likely to 
question political legitimacy (or cite people questioning political legitimacy) in general, 
explaining the overall low share of legitimation statements in these countries, but not the 
negative tone of these rare evaluations, or the comparatively low level of media attention to 
climate change in general (Schmidt et al., 2013, Broadbent et al., 2016).  
     As countries may differ in their understanding of the role of citizens (Dalton and Welzel, 
2015), of what is considered fairness or the common good (Ylä-Anttila and Luhtakallio, 
2017), and how trust in science – and in political decisions based on science – is generated 
(i.e., the ‘civic epistemologies’, Jasanoff, 2007), these differences could affect the prevalence 
of certain legitimation arguments, independent of the policy field under discussion. 
     In other words, India’s stronger focus on input criteria, i.e., on participation as a criterion, 
might either be the result of a concrete desire to strengthen the country’s role in international 
climate governance or of a political culture emphasizing participation rights in general. 
Unfortunately, we currently lack both comparative studies of political cultures and of 
legitimation debates focusing on other policy fields to be able to disentangle this. For 
international speakers aiming to increase the support for climate politics in specific countries, 
this knowledge of specific political cultures would be valuable to ensure that they are using 
the legitimation arguments more likely to resonate with their audiences.  
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     On a more general level, journalists and other speakers aiming to foster support of and thus 
compliance with international and national climate policies would be well advised to use a 
broader range of arguments to justify the climate regime, e.g., climate policies need not only 
be implemented because they are the only effective way of addressing the problem of climate 
change, but because they are fair and we all benefit from them. Such a broader range of 
arguments is more likely to resonate with a wide range of allies and opponents, thus 
increasing the likelihood of support (Ylä-Anttila and Luhtakallio, 2017). This aligns well with 
Giddens’ (2011) assessment that climate change policy can only succeed when it is integrated 
within wider political programs that address other problems such as social justice or economic 
competitiveness.  
     As the relevance of climate politics, and especially national climate politics, continues to 
increase, future studies should exploit this growing public attention by comparing our findings 
with other political events, or phases of routine coverage, focusing particularly on the national 
level of climate regimes. After all, our study shows that analyzing legitimacy debates is a 
worthwhile endeavor.  
  
(DE-)LEGITIMIZING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLITICS 25 
 
References 
 
No author (2009) One cheer for Copenhagen; An agreement makes some -- if not enough -- 
headway. Cue the U.S. Senate. Washington Post, 20 December: A24. 
No author (2014) Lima climate talks run into extra time with uncertain outcome. Times of 
India, 14 December.  
No author (2014) Warming up for round one of the great Lima and Paris climate change 
blame game. The Australian, 12 December: 13. 
Bernauer T, Mohrenberg S and Koubi V (2016) How relevant are input and output legitimacy 
in international environmental governance? National Centre of Competence in Research 
(NCCR) Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century Working Paper: 94. 
Billett S (2010) Dividing climate change: global warming in the Indian mass media. Climatic 
Change 99(1-2): 1–16. 
Boykoff MT and Boykoff JM (2004) Balance as bias: global warming and the US prestige 
press. Global Environmental Change 14: 125–136. 
Brüggemann M, Silva-Schmidt F de, Hoppe I, Arlt D and Schmitt J B (2017) The 
appeasement effect of a United Nations climate summit on the German public. Nature 
Climate Change 7(11): 783–787.  
Dalton R and Welzel C (2015) The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive 
Citizens. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Easton D (1965) A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Chicago, London: University of 
Chicago. 
Ferree MM, Gamson WA, Gerhards J and Rucht D (2002) Shaping Abortion Discourse. 
Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University. 
Franck TM (1990) The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York, NY, et al.: Oxford 
University. 
(DE-)LEGITIMIZING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLITICS 26 
 
Fuchs D (2011) Cultural Diversity, European Identity and the Legitimacy of the EU. 
Cheltenham et.al.: Elgar. 
Gerhards J, Offerhaus A and Roose J (2009) Wer ist verantwortlich? Die Europäische Union, 
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